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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030474-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* ;fe * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, Judge James R. Taylor presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Does Utah's communications fraud statute prohibit conduct protected under 
the First Amendment, where the statute punishes falsehoods only if they are made 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth? 
Whether a criminal statute is overbroad under the First Amendment is a question of 
law this Court reviews for correctness. See In re IML., 2002 UT 110, ^  8, 61 P.3d 1038. 
Issue 2: Did the communications fraud statute adequately notify defendant that he 
would be punished for providing false personal information to a hospital as part of a scheme 
with his girlfriend to avoid paying medical bills and to prevent her arrest on outstanding 
warrants? 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law this Court reviews for 
correctness. See State v. McGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Issue 3: Should this Court review defendant's claim that the communications fraud 
statute as applied here violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment where defendant did not raise his claim in the trial court? 
The trial court never considered this claim, so no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999), attached 
as Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of communications fraud or, in the 
alternative, one count of identity theft for his participation in a scheme to provide false 
personal information for himself and his girlfriend to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
(R. 1 -2). Defendant moved to dismiss the communications fraud charge, asserting that it was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Art. 1, § 15 of the Utah Constitution (R. 59-69). The district court 
denied defendant's motion (R. 198:132). A jury subsequently convicted defendant of second 
degree felony communications fraud (R. 144; 198:221). On April 30, 2003, the court 
sentenced defendant to sixty days in jail and ordered him to pay restitution of $6,041.41 
(R. 146-50). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court (R. 152). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On December 10, 2001, defendant took his girlfriend, Stevoni Wells, to the 
emergency room of the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center to have her treated for spinal 
meningitis (R. 198:51, 97, 99, 141-4). Wells had a fever of 105 degrees and was delirious 
(R. 198:97, 102). She could later recall few details about the process of checking into the 
emergency room (R. 198:102). She did remember, however, that she checked in under a 
fake name, Stacy Sorenson (R. 198: 99-100). Wells later admitted that she used a fake name 
to escape paying the medical bill and to prevent her arrest on any outstanding warrants (R. 
198:104,107-08). 
Because Wells was delirious, defendant helped admit her to the hospital. Defendant 
and Wells jointly represented to the triage nurse that they were married (R. 198:145). 
Defendant told the hospital admissions staff that Wells' maiden name was Wall (R. 147). 
Defendant also signed Wells' admission form "Jeremy Sorenson" and identified himself as 
Wells'"spouse" (R. 198:148; State's Ex. No. 1). The personal information on the admission 
form, including defendant and Wells' names, addresses, phone numbers, social security 
numbers, and employment information, was all false (R. 198:72,75-76,100-02; State's Ex. 
No. 1). The admission form indicated that both the patient and the person who signed the 
form were responsible for the hospital bill (R. 198:79; State's Ex. No. 1). Wells never paid 
Unless otherwise stated, the facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
3 
her $5,867.83 bill, and the hospital was unable to collect on the bill because of the false 
personal information Wells and defendant provided (R. 198:70-73; State's Ex. No. 4). 
Wells later confessed, as part of a guilty plea to forgery, that she lied to the hospital to 
avoid paying her medical bills and to prevent anyone from discovering that she had 
outstanding warrants for her arrest (R. 198:99, 107-08). Defendant maintained that he was 
not concerned about the medical bills or the arrest warrants, but lied only so that the hospital 
would allow him to remain with Wells during her treatment (R. 198:153, 158). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: A law that targets harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct may 
nevertheless be challenged as unconstitutional if it also prohibits a substantial amount of 
conduct protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment does not, however, 
protect false statements that are made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth. It follows that Utah's communications fraud statute does not prohibit any conduct 
protected by the First Amendment because it punishes only those falsehoods that are made 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
POINT II: A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it fails to adequately notify 
citizens and law enforcement of what sorts of conduct the statute punishes. A statute that 
does not implicate any constitutionally protected conduct, however, is void for vagueness 
only if it is vague in all of its applications. A defendant may not challenge a statute as void 
for vagueness, therefore, if the statute is clear as applied to him. In the instant case, 
4 
defendant's conduct falls squarely within the plain language of the statute. The statute is not, 
therefore, vague. 
POINT III: Defendant may not raise a claim on appeal that he did not raise in the 
trial court unless he argues plain error or exceptional circumstances. Defendant did not 
preserve his Eighth Amendment claim in the trial court and has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. This Court should, therefore, refuse to consider his 
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE DOES NOT 
PUNISH ANY CONDUCT PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT OVERBROAD 
Defendant asserts that Utah's communications fraud statute violates the overbreadth 
doctrine of the First Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 14-26. Specifically, he claims the statute 
"broadly imposes criminal liability for all falsehoods," including falsehoods protected under 
the First Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 20. Defendant's claim fails because, as this Court 
recognized in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 11 2004 WL 1794474, the 
communications fraud statute does not punish any speech protected under the First 
Amendment. 
Whether a criminal statute is overbroad under the First Amendment is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. See In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, ^ 8, 61 P.3d 1038. "When 
addressing such a challenge, this [C]ourt presumes that the statute is valid, and [it] resolve[s] 
any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id. 
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A. A statute is overbroad only if it prohibits a substantial amount of 
protected speech. 
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may 
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally 
to others in situations not before the Court." New Yorkv. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,767 (1982). 
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to this general rule for statutes 
"that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of 
third parties." Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984). "The showing that a law punishes a substantial amount 
of protected free speech, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep . . . 
suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law. . ." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113,118-
19 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 9, 
2004 WL 1794474. 
Because the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601,613 (1973) "[o]nly a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on 
its face," City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, (1987) (emphasis added); see also 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, If 9. It is not enough "that one can conceive of some 
impermissible applications of a statute." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800. The 
overbreadth must be real and substantial. Ashcroft v. A.CL. U., 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) 
(citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). Moreover, the punishment of protected speech is 
"judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118-19 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
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B. The communications fraud statute reaches only unprotected speech 
because it punishes only those falsehoods made with at least a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
This Court recently held in State v. Norris that "the communications fraud statute is 
not overbroad on its face" and, in fact, "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." 
2004 UT App 267, fflf 11-12 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An analysis of Utah's 
communications fraud statute under the First Amendment demonstrates that holding is 
correct. 
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth, a court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, ^  15 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, | 9 . 
Utah's communications fraud statute punishes 
[a]ny person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999). On its face, the statute punishes any person who 
makes a false statement to obtain something of value from another. The statute also provides 
a mens rea element, however, that limits those false statements which the State may punish. 
"A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (7). It 
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is this mens rea element that insulates the communications fraud statute from overbreadth 
under the First Amendment. 
"[TJhere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Welch, 418 
U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Nevertheless, "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some 
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." Id. at 341. The First Amendment'"was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
Although, "[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances 
society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues," the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). The Court thus created some 
"breathing space" for inadvertent falsehoods. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342,347 ("We hold that 
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood 
injurious to a private individual."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that public officials 
2
 Defendant claims the statute is also overbroad under the free speech provisions in 
Art. I § 15 of the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 18, 24. He notes that the state provision is 
"deemed more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment." Aplt. Br. at 18 
(quotations and citations omitted). He does not, however, explain how it is more inclusive or 
provide any separate state constitutional analysis. This Court should therefore not consider 
defendant's claim under the state constitution. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed.") 
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may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood unless it can be proven that the 
falsehood was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not"); see also I.M.L., 2002 UT 110,113 ("'[E]ven where the utterance is 
false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area 
preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.5" 
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)). This "breathing space" does not, 
however, permit a person to publish falsehoods intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80; I.M.L., 
2002 UT 110,^13. 
Utah's communications fraud statute does not punish any falsehood protected by the 
First Amendment. See Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 11. A false or fraudulent statement 
made to acquire something of value is only punishable if it is made "intentionally, 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). 
Such falsehoods receive no protection from the First Amendment. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
279-80. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that "the statute criminalizes all falsehoods, some of 
which are expressly provided constitutional protection." Aplt Br. at 20. He reaches this 
conclusion by arguing that because the communications fraud statute "criminalizes false or 
insincere behavior/trickery, the object of which is to obtain anything of value..., the statute 
effectively criminalizes all false communications." Aplt. Br. at 21. In other words, he 
argues, "trickery or insincere behavior, by definition, underlies all false communications; and 
9 
the object of such communications will always be something considered of value to the 
communicator." Aplt. Br. at 21. 
Defendant's argument is directly contrary to this Court's holding in Norris that "the 
communications fraud statute does not prohibit all false 'pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions,' only those made where an individual seeks 'to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value.'" Norris, 2004 UT 
App 267, ^ 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)). Many false statements made to 
obtain something of value are not made to trick or deceive another, but are made negligently 
or inadvertently. For example, a used car dealer may tell a safety-conscious prospective 
buyer that a particular vehicle has airbags on both the driver and passenger side, when, in 
fact, the vehicle does not have airbags. If the dealer believed in good faith after adequate 
research that the vehicle was equipped with airbags, then he has only perpetrated an 
inadvertent or negligent falsehood and is not guilty of communications fraud. 
Defendant's claim that "a 'falsehood' by definition cannot exist without at least a 
reckless disregard for the truth" leads him to erroneously conclude "that even some 
falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth are 
protected speech." Aplt. Br. at 20. This conclusion, however, finds no support in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Even falsehoods made in the most protected area of speech— 
those made during public debate about a public official or public figure—may still be 
punished if made with a reckless disregard for the truth. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
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Defendant posits two hypothetical examples that he claims demonstrate that the 
communications fraud statute punishes a substantial amount of protected speech: (1) a 
political candidate who recklessly misrepresents his position on a divisive issue for the 
purpose of obtaining votes and (2) an advertiser who communicates to consumers that "a 
certain brand of lipstick stays on all day or that a certain mascara does not clump, knowing 
the opposite is true." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant's examples are inapposite. The candidate's 
statements are not punishable under the communications fraud statute because, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized, the question of whether a candidate misrepresented his 
position is not capable of objective verification. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872P.2d 
999, 1019 (Utah 1994) ("Whether West actually intended to dupe voters into electing him 
mayor by misrepresenting his position on municipal power is something only West himself 
knows, not something that is subject to objective verification."). If a statement or omission 
cannot be proved false by resort to objective evidence, it cannot form the basis of conviction 
for communications fraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (punishing only those 
engaged in fraud or using false pretenses). 
Defendant's hypothetical example of the advertiser's statements is likewise 
inapposite. He asserts the statements are protected "puffing." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. Puffing is 
the general praise of one's own wares to enhance the buyer's estimation of the wares. See 
Boudv. SNDCO, 2002 UT 83, 1f 13 n.2,54 P.3d 1131. It is used to distinguish mere opinions 
from objectively provable statements of fact. Id. If the advertiser's statements are indeed 
mere puffing, they cannot be proved true or false and are not punishable under the 
11 
communications fraud statute. If, however, the statements are capable of being proved true 
or false, the statements are not puffing and are, in fact, punishable under federal law. See 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (permitting civil suit against anyone who "in commercial 
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another personfs goods, services, or commercial activities). 
Defendant asserts that the instant case "illustrates the overly broad application" of 
Utah's communications fraud statute because the jury must have found him guilty based on 
an overbroad reading of the statute—that defendant was "guilty of trickery devised to stay 
with Wells and to monitor her medical treatment—rather than of devising a systematic plan 
or scheme to defraud the hospital of some monetary value." Aplt. Br. at 21, 23. Defendant 
reaches this conclusion only by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. Aplt. Br. 
at 22. He argues that there was no evidence that he intended to defraud the hospital of the 
value of Wells' medical bills or that Wells' medical treatment was contingent upon 
defendant posing as her husband. Defendant may not attack the sufficiency of the evidence 
unless he first satisfies the marshaling requirement. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, *[[ 14, 
989 P.2d 1065 (requiring one challenging the evidence to first marshal the evidence in favor 
of the jury's verdict before attacking the verdict). Defendant has not marshaled the evidence, 
and this Court should therefore refuse to consider his challenge to the evidence. Id. at f 1 6 
(refusing to consider challenge to sufficiency of evidence where defendant did not first 
marshal evidence supporting guilt). 
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Even if defendant had properly marshaled the evidence, his claim would fail because 
the ground on which he now claims the jury convicted him was his own defense at trial. The 
State never argued that the jury should convict defendant because he lied to the hospital in 
order to stay with Wells during her treatment. Rather, the State argued only that defendant 
lied to help Wells avoid paying the hospital bill and to help her avoid arrest on outstanding 
warrants. It was defendant who claimed that he lied only so that he could stay with Wells 
during her treatment and that the jury should therefore acquit him (R. 198:208). Thus, had 
the jury found that defendant acted only with intent to stay with Wells, and not to defraud the 
hospital, it would have acquitted defendant. 
Thus defendant's claim fails. 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Defendant asserts that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
Aplt. Br. at 26-32. Specifically, he claims the terms "anything of value," "artifice," and 
"communicate" are not subject to objective measurement. Aplt. Br. at 29. He contends that 
the broad terms of the statute permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and prevent 
the defendant from adequately preparing a defense. 
A law that is not facially overbroad "may nevertheless be challenged on its face as 
unduly vague, in violation of due process." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). "[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
13 
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Vagueness 
claims, therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute 
adequately notices the proscribed conduct.'" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 14, 84 P.3d 
1171 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987)). "If a statute '"is 
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,"' it is not 
unconstitutionally vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 191-92) (quoting State v. 
Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982))). 
Moreover, where the statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," the 
Court will "uphold the challenge only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95 (emphasis added). In such cases, the 
statute "must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand." Id. at 495 n.7 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted). "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 
Id. at 495. Thus, a defendant whose conduct clearly falls within a challenged statute cannot 
prevail on a vagueness challenge. Id. at 495 n.7. 
Defendant claims that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague in 
its use of three terms: (1) "artifice," (2) "communicate," and (3) "anything of value." Aplt. 
Brf. at 25. "[B]ecause the communications fraud statute 'implicates no constitutionally 
protected conduct,' [defendant must show that it 'is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications."' Norris, 2004 UT App 267, U 12 (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-
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95). In other words, if the statute is clear as applied to defendant, it is not void for 
vagueness. 
A. The terms "artifice" and "communicate" are not unconstitutionally 
vague on their face or as applied to defendant. 
Defendant contends that the terms "artifice" and "communicate" are 
unconstitutionally vague. Aplt. Brf. at 29. This Court has already held that both "artifice" 
and "communicate," as used in the communications fraud statute, are not unconstitutionally 
vague on their face. See Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^[13-14. Those terms are also not vague 
as applied to defendant. Defendant's oral and written statements that he was Wells' husband 
and that his name was Jeremy Sorenson certainly constitute communication. Defendant's 
conduct also constituted an artifice because defendant deceived the hospital staff as to his 
and Wells' identities. See Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 13 (defining artifice as a clever plan 
or idea, especially one intended to deceive). 
B. The phrase "anything of value" is not unconstitutionally vague on 
its face or as applied to defendant. 
Defendant contends that "anything of value" is unconstitutionally vague. Aplt. Br. at 
29. He asserts that "anything of value" is not even remotely susceptible to objective 
measurement and is therefore open to interpretation. Aplt. Brf. at 29. 
Value is defined as "relative worth, utility, or importance" or as "something 
intrinsically valuable or desirable." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2530 (3rd ed. 
1993). Under this common definition, the phrase "anything of value" in the statute punishes 
a person for communicating a falsehood to obtain from another something of worth, utility, 
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or importance, other than money or property. This clearly encompasses, among other things, 
services, such as the hospital services Wells received, or consent, such as consent to traverse 
another's property or consent to engage in sexual intercourse. Admittedly, such a definition 
of "anything of value" makes the scope of the statute quite broad. The broad use of a term, 
however, does not make it vague. See Norris, 2004 UT 267, \ 14; State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
The phrase "anything of value" is also not vague as applied to defendant. The State 
argued, and the evidence supported, that the jury should convict defendant of 
communications fraud under one of two theories: (1) that defendant and Wells devised a 
scheme to obtain free hospital services by providing false personal information; or (2) that 
defendant and Wells devised a scheme to conceal Wells' identity from authorities to help her 
avoid arrest on outstanding warrants (R. 198:196). A scheme to obtain free medical services 
falls squarely within the meaning of a "scheme or artifice . . . to obtain from another . . . 
anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801. Thus, defendant's conduct fits within 
the plain meaning of the statute, and defendant cannot complain that the communications 
fraud statute is vague as applied to him. 
A scheme to avoid detection by the authorities, on the other hand, does not fit the 
meaning of a "scheme or artifice . . . to obtain from another... anything of value." Id. One 
cannot "obtain" anonymity from anybody. Id. It does, however, fit under an alternative 
element in the same subsection that punishes any person who devises a "scheme or artifice to 
defraud another." Id. This Court has construed the word fraud to mean "an intentional 
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misrepresentation offered for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it to gain some 
advantage." In re P.S, 2001 UT App 305, ^  17, 38 P.3d 303. Defendant made an intentional 
misrepresentation to the hospital, and aided Wells in making the same misrepresentations, in 
order to prevent the hospital or anyone else from discovering that Wells had some 
outstanding arrest warrants. 
Such intent is very similar to the intent this Court upheld as satisfying the "purpose to 
defraud" requirement of Utah's forgery statute in In re P.S.. P.S. signed a false name to a 
traffic citation. See id. at f 4. This Court upheld his conviction for forgery against a claim 
that P.S.'s actions did not demonstrate a purpose to defraud. See id. at f 19. It noted that 
P.S.'s conduct was intended to gain some advantage by concealing his identity to avoid 
criminal liability. See id. at ^  18. In the instant case, defendant and Wells sought to conceal 
her identity from the hospital and authorities in order to gain some advantage, i.e. to avoid 
the consequences of Wells' past criminal conduct and to avoid paying the hospital bill. That 
defendant made the statement to the hospital rather than the police, as did P.S., does not alter 
the analysis because the communications fraud statute punishes a person for defrauding 
another by making a false statement to "any person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) 
(emphasis added). A person may thus be punished for making a false statement to one 
person, such as a hospital clerk, with intent to defrauding another, such as the police. 
Defendant asserts that the vagueness of the statute gave the State "an enviable number 
of options on which to proceed in its prosecution" thereby promoting arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Aplt. Br. at 30. He asserts that the "Information did not 
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provide notice of what specific conduct the State was alleging constituted the offense, thus 
inhibiting [his] ability to prepare his defense." Aplt. Br. at 31. 
Defendant waived this argument below when he waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing and failed to request a bill of particulars until two days before trial (R. 19, 88-92). 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e) (requiring a defendant to request a bill of particulars within ten 
days of arraignment or at such later time as court may permit). The preliminary hearing 
"acts as a discovery device advising the accused of the details of the charges." State v. 
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Bush, 2000 UT App 10, If 24, 47 
P.3d 69 ("The purpose of the right to a preliminary hearing is to secure to the accused... the 
right to be advised of the nature of the accusation against him . . ." (quotations omitted)). 
Having waived his opportunity to be informed of the specific nature of the charges against 
him, defendant cannot now complain that he did not receive notice of what aspects of his 
conduct at the hospital constituted communications fraud. 
Defendant also claims that the statute is vague as applied to him because the "jury 
presumably found [that] . . . he obtained value by being allowed to stay with Wells as her 
purported husband and monitor her medical treatment." Aplt. Br. at 30 As explained in 
Point I, the State never argued this theory to jury. This was, in fact, defendant's defense 
3
 Defendant does not assert any error in the trial court's denial of his Motion for Bill 
of Particulars. 
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(198:208). The jury would not, therefore, have used such a finding as a basis to convict, but 
rather, as a basis to acquit.4 
III. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT PROHIBITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT5 
Defendant asserts that the application of the communications fraud statute to the facts 
of his case violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Specifically, he claims that the punishment of one to fifteen 
years in prison is disproportionate to the offense because providing false personal 
information to a police officer rather than a hospital is only a class B misdemeanor. Aplt. Br. 
at 32. This Court should refuse to review defendant's claim because it is unpreserved. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11,10 P.3d 346. This "rule applies to every claim, 
4
 Defendant also complains for the first time on appeal that under subsections (2) and 
(5) of the statute, the State could both aggregate the value of the things sought to be obtained 
for purposes of enhancing the degree of the offense and charge the defendant with separate 
counts for each separate communication. See Aplt. Brf. at 30-31. This exact issue is 
currently before this Court in another case, State v. Bradshaw, Case No. 20020137-CA (oral 
argument January 27, 2003). This Court should refuse to consider defendant's argument in 
this case, however, because he did not preserve it in the trial court. See State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, TI11, 10 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal."). 
5
 This section is intended to respond to Point III of defendant's brief: SECTION 76-
10-1801 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, PARTICULARLY AS APPLIED TO FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. Much of that section is repeats defendant's prior arguments concerning 
vagueness and overbreadth as applied to his case. He raises one new argument, however, to 
which the State responds in this Point. 
19 
including constitutional questions . . ." Id. To properly preserve a claim, a party must 
present the objection to the trial court, state the grounds for the objection specifically and 
distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its supporting arguments become part of the trial 
record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). 
This Court may review an unpreserved claim only if it finds exceptional 
circumstances or plain error See Holgate, 2000 UT 74. f 11; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). Appellants must, however, raise plain error and exceptional 
circumstances in their opening brief, or the claim is waived. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89, If 23, 16 P.3d 540, cert, denied 29 P.3d 1 (2001) ("Generally, issues raised by an 
appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered 
waived and will not be considered by the appellate court."); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT 
App 3,^12 n.4, 63 P.3d 110 (refusing to consider robbery defendant's unpreserved claim 
that State never proved that he had purpose to deprive where defendant raised plain error for 
the first time in reply brief); State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218, cert, 
denied 72 P.3d 685 (refusing to consider defendant's unpreserved claim that jury instructions 
were incorrect where defendant raised plain error for first time in reply brief); cf. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief"). This rule prevents "unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue 
[is] first raised in the reply brief and the respondent [has] no opportunity to respond." 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^  23. 
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Defendant never asserted below that the communications fraud statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to him in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment. Moreover, he has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. This Court should therefore refuse to consider his claim. 
Even if the claim were properly preserved, it fails on the merits. The mere fact that 
one crime is punished more severely than a similar crime does not implicate the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 
1377 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that an appellate court "may not require the legislature to 
select the least severe penalty possible"). Indeed, the legislature may impose harsher 
penalties on certain crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so. See State v. Clark, 
632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is 
imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related 
or of which it is a subcategory"). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this 2C day of August 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-10-1801. Communications fraud - Elements - Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly 
with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought 
to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought 
to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought 
to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than 
the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be measured 
by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in 
Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element 
of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a scheme 
or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
